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Abstract
We test whether different empirical methods give different results when evaluating
job-search assistance programs. Budgetary problems at the Dutch unemployment
insurance (UI) administration in March 2010, caused a sharp drop in the availability
of these programs. Using administrative data provided by the UI administration,
we evaluate the effect of the program using (1) the policy discontinuity as a quasi-
experiment, (2) conventional matching methods, and (3) the timing-of-events model.
All three methods use the same data to consider the same program in the same set-
ting, and also yield similar results. The program reduces job finding during the first
six months after enrollment. At longer durations, the quasi-experimental estimates
are not significantly different from zero, while the non-experimental methods show a
small negative effect.
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1 Introduction
In 2002, the Dutch market for job-search assistance programs was privatized, imply-
ing that the unemployment insurance (UI) administration buys services of private
companies to assist benefits recipients in their job search. Due to the economic
crisis the demand for programs increased sharply in 2009 and early 2010, leading to
budgetary problems in March 2010. The government refused to extend the budget
and as a result, the purchase of new programs was terminated within a period of
two weeks. During the remainder of the year, new UI benefits recipients could no
longer enroll in these programs. In this paper, we exploit this policy discontinuity
to evaluate the effects on job finding. In addition, we estimate the same effects
using non-experimental methods (matching and timing-of-events) and compare the
results of the three methods.
The main challenge in evaluating active labor-market programs is selective par-
ticipation (Heckman et al. (1999), Abbring and Heckman (2007)). As shown in a
meta-analysis by Card et al. (2010), over 50% of evaluation studies use longitudinal
data and compare a treatment group with a control group, where the control group
is typically constructed by matching on observed characteristics. Over one-third of
the studies use duration models. Less than 10% of the studies exploit an experi-
mental design. In his seminal study, LaLonde (1986) shows that non-experimental
estimators produce results that do not concur with those from experimental evi-
dence. Dehejia and Wahba (1999) test the performance of matching estimators,
finding that those are closer to the experimental evidence. Their findings are, how-
ever, disputed by Smith and Todd (2005), who evaluate the same program and show
that the findings are not robust to different specifications and the use of different
samples and different sets of covariates. They refer to Heckman et al. (1997) who
argue that matching estimators can only replicate experimental findings if three re-
quirements are fulfilled. First, use the same data source for treatment and control
group (in particular the outcome variable should be measured in the same way).
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Second, treated and control individuals are active in the same local labor market.
Third, the data should contain a rich set of variables that affect both program par-
ticipation and labor-market outcomes. Smith and Todd (2005) argue that each of
these requirements is likely to be violated in the evaluations by LaLonde (1986) and
Dehejia and Wahba (1999).
We build on this literature by performing a similar comparison of methods,
using administrative data. Our main contribution is twofold. First, since our quasi-
experimental estimates are identified from a large-scale policy discontinuity in 2010,
the setting is particularly suitable for such a comparison. Our data fulfill the cri-
teria mentioned by Smith and Todd (2005). The administrative data allow the
use of high-quality information on a rich set of variables, including individual char-
acteristics, pre-unemployment labor-market variables, current unemployment spell
characteristics and any assistance provided by the UI administration and private
providers. As the policy discontinuity was nationwide, the sample size is substan-
tial. Since the policy discontinuity occurred recently, programs and labor-market
conditions are similar to those currently in many countries. Second, for the non-
experimental analysis we not only apply matching estimators, but also estimate the
timing-of-events model.
We exploit the policy discontinuity to estimate how program participation affects
job finding. The variation in program provision due to the quasi-experiment is large.
Within a month, the weekly number of new program participants dropped from 1300
to less than 80 and remained below 50 for the remainder of the year. We estimate
the treatment effect on the treated by comparing the job-finding rates of cohorts
entering unemployment at different points in time, though relatively short after
each other. Since they reach the discontinuity at different unemployment durations
they are affected differentially, which identifies the effect of the programs. Seasonal
differences in the labor market are controlled for using cohorts from the previous
year. Our results show that after starting a program, the job-finding rate is reduced
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significantly for several months (i.e. lock-in effect). After half a year it increases,
up to a zero difference in job finding 12 to 18 months after the enrollment in the
program.
We compare these results to matching estimators (using inverse probability
weighting). The results show a significant negative effect of program participation
directly after entering the program. Even though the negative effect decreases in
magnitude over time, estimated effects remain significantly negative after 18 months.
Next, we estimate a timing-of-events model (Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)),
which allows for selection on unobservables by adding more structure to the model.
It jointly models the hazard rate to employment and the hazard rate to program par-
ticipation. Estimating the model we find that the program reduces the job-finding
rate in the first six months, while it slightly increases the job-finding rate at longer
durations. Overall this leads to a negative effect on employment in the first two
years, and a zero effect afterwards.
To summarize, all methods find a significantly negative effect in the short run,
while only the quasi-experimental estimates and the timing-of-events model find
that the effect in the medium run is zero. The difference in results is small, and the
main policy recommendations are the same for all methods. The different methods
use different samples. While matching and timing-of-events allow using a large
sample containing all individuals entering UI over more than two years, the quasi-
experimental approach requires focusing on a smaller sample that is most affected
by the discontinuity. We test whether the matching and timing-of-events results
depend on the choice of sample and find that results are almost identical when
applying these methods to the smaller sample.
Interpreting the findings should be done with care. The quasi-experimental re-
sults rely on a common-trend assumption, stating that in the absence of the policy
discontinuity, different cohorts experience similar outflow to work, up to a constant
difference in the hazard rates. Furthermore, the job-search assistance program con-
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tains a mix of caseworker meetings, job referrals and goal setting in the job-search
process. These elements are often also present in job-search assistance programs
in other countries, but likely with a different intensity. The job-search assistance
is offered in addition to of the “basic” assistance of the UI administration (mostly
irregular meetings with caseworkers), which is also the case in other countries. The
set-up in which caseworkers have substantial discretion when deciding which job
seekers are assigned to programs is a feature common to many UI administrations.
Finally, the UI benefits system is quite generous when being compared to the US or
UK, but similar to other continental European countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We briefly discuss the liter-
ature on the evaluation of active labor-market programs in Section 2, and describe
the institutional setting and the budgetary problems which led to the policy discon-
tinuity in Section 3. An overview of the data is provided in Section 4. In Section 5
we define our treatment effect of interest. In Section 6 we present non-experimental
results from the matching and timing-of-events estimators. In section 7 we discuss
how the discontinuity allows identifying the same treatment effect and present es-
timation results. Section 8 compares the results from the different methods and
provides a discussion. Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature
There is a large literature studying the effectiveness of active labor-market pro-
grams. Reviews provided by Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) show that there is
some consensus on the effects of different types of programs on post-unemployment
outcomes such as employment, wages and job stability. For example, job-search as-
sistance is found to have more positive effects on job finding than alternatives such
as public-sector employment programs.
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Card et al. (2010) report that 9% of the evaluation studies in their meta-analysis
use an experimental approach.1 While randomized experiments are often consid-
ered the gold standard, they have also been criticized, mostly on practical grounds.
For example, as discussed by Heckman et al. (1999), experiments are typically ex-
pensive, difficult to implement and may lead to ethical objections. Alternatively,
quasi-experimental approaches are used.2 Such approaches use institutional features
or policy changes that generate random variation in program participation. When
convincing sources of variation are found, they may offer useful alternatives to ran-
domized experiments. Such variation may only apply to specific groups, leading
to complications such as small samples or local treatment effects. Many studies
use non-experimental methods such as matching (over 50% of the studies listed by
Card et al. (2010).3 Especially with increasingly availability of high quality admin-
istrative data, matching approaches become attractive. Some other studies apply
the timing-of-events model (Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)), which makes some
functional-form assumptions which allow to model unobserved factors that lead to
selective program participation.4
An interesting question is whether a relationship exists between the methodology
and the empirical results. This question is investigated across studies, in the surveys
by Card et al. (2010) and Kluve (2010). They find little evidence suggesting such
1See for example, Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) who analyze a randomized ex-
periment on counseling and monitoring, to show that the program merely shifts job-search effort
from the informal to the formal search channel. Graversen and Van Ours (2008) evaluate an in-
tensive activation program in Denmark, using a randomized experiment. Card et al. (2011) show
estimates of the effect of a training program offered to a random sample of applicants in the Do-
minican Republic. Behaghel et al. (2014) perform a large controlled experiment, randomizing job
seekers across publicly and privately provided counseling programs.
2Dolton and O’Neill (2002) use random delays in program participation to assess the effect of a
job search assistance program in the UK. Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2013) analyze the effect
of both an re-employment bonus and sanctions, exploiting policies changes in the bonus levels.
Cockx and Dejemeppe (2012) use a regression-discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of
extra job-search monitoring in Belgium. Van den Berg et al. (2014) apply regression discontinuity
with duration data to the introduction of the New Deal for the Young People in the UK.
3For example, Brodaty et al. (2002) apply a matching estimator to estimate the effect of acti-
vation programs for long-term unemployed workers in France, Sianesi (2004) investigates different
effects of active labor-market programs in Sweden and Lechner et al. (2011) looks at long-run
effects of training programs in Germany.
4For example, this model is used to evaluate the effect of benefit sanctions in the Netherlands
(Van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring et al. (2005)) and to evaluate a training program in
France by Cre´pon et al. (2012).
6
a relationship. In particular, Card et al. (2010) find no significant difference in
results between experimental and non-experimental studies. Ideally, one would like
to compare different approaches in the same the setting.
Several studies have focused on comparing outcomes of different methods. LaLonde
(1986), Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Smith and Todd (2005) show that the dif-
ference between experimental and non-experimental estimates can be substantial,
using data from a job-training program in the US. These results were followed by
a number of papers that consider comparing different methodologies. Lalive et al.
(2008) evaluate the effect of activation programs in Switzerland. They find that
matching estimators and estimates from a timing-of-events model lead to different
results. Mueser et al. (2007) use a wide set of matching estimators to estimate the
earnings effect of job-training programs in the US. They compare findings of the dif-
ferent estimators to estimates from experimental methods reported in the literature.
Biewen et al. (2014) compare estimates of the effect of training programs, showing
that results are sensitive to data features and methodological choices. Kastoryano
and Van der Klaauw (2011) evaluate job-search assistance and compare different
methods for dynamic treatment evaluation and find that results are similar.
Despite the increased focus on comparing different methods, evidence applying
both (quasi-)experimental and non-experimental methods within the same setting
is scarce. As argued by Heckman et al. (1997), a valid comparison between match-
ing estimates and experimental estimates requires applying those methods using
the same program, the same geographical region and the same data source. We
contribute to the literature by exploiting an administrative data set that allows for
different methods while fulfilling these criteria.
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3 Institutional setting and the policy discontinu-
ity
In this section we briefly describe the institutional setting at the moment of our
observation period and the policy discontinuity in program provision, which we
exploit in the empirical analysis.
In the Netherlands, UI is organized at the nationwide level. The UI adminis-
tration (UWV) pays benefits to workers, who involuntary lost at least five working
hours per week (or half of their working hours if this is less than five). Workers
should have worked for at least 26 weeks out of the last 36 weeks. Fulfillment of this
”weeks condition” provides an eligibility to benefits for three months. If the worker
has worked at least four out of the last five years, the benefits eligibility period is
extended with one month for each additional year of employment. The maximum
UI benefits duration is 38 months. During the first two months benefits are 75% of
the previous wage, capped at a daily maximum. From the third month onward it
is 70% of the previous wage (see De Groot and Van der Klaauw (2014) for a more
extensive discussion).
A UI benefits recipient is required to register at the public employment office,
and to search for work actively. The latter requires making at least one job ap-
plication each week. caseworkers at the UI administration provide basic job-search
assistance through individual meetings. Benefit recipients are obliged to accept any
suitable job offer.5 Caseworkers are responsible for monitoring these obligations. In
general, the intensity of meetings is low though (only in case the caseworker suspects
that a recipient is unable to find work without assistance a meeting is scheduled).
In 2009, caseworkers had the possibility of assigning an individual to a range of
programs aiming at increasing the job-finding rate, if she judged that the benefits
recipient required more than the usual guidance. A large diversity of programs
5During the first six months a suitable job is defined as a job at the same level as the previous
job, between six and 12 months it can be a job below this level, and after 12 months any job is
suitable and should be accepted.
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existed, including job-search assistance, vacancy referral, training in writing appli-
cation letters and CV’s, wage subsidies, subsidized employment in the public sector
and schooling. Some of these were provided internally by the UI administration,
while others were purchased externally from private companies. Our analysis fo-
cuses on the externally provided programs. These can be broadly classified as (with
relative frequency in parentheses) job search assistance programs (56%), training or
schooling (31%), subsidized employment (2%) and other programs (11%). Though
some guidelines existed, caseworkers had a large degree of discretion in deciding
about program assignment.
The lack of centralized program assignment together with an increased inflow in
unemployment due to the recession caused that many more individuals were assigned
to these programs in 2009 and early 2010 than the budget allowed. Therefore, the
entire budget had been exhausted by March 2010. Authorities refused to extend the
budget and declared that no new programs should be purchased from that moment
onward.6 Assistance offered internally by the UI administration continued without
change. In Section 4 we show that indeed the number of new program entrants
dropped to almost zero in March 2010 and remained very low afterwards.
4 Data
We use a large administrative dataset provided by the UI administration, containing
all individuals who started collecting UI benefits between April 2008 and September
2010 in the Netherlands. The dataset contains 608,998 observations (each UI spell
is considered an observation, though for some individuals there are multiple spells).7
6This was declared by the minister of social affairs, in a letter to parliament on March 15.
An exception was made for a small number of specially targeted programs (mostly for long-term
unemployed workers).
7The original dataset contains 671,743 unemployment spells. We exclude 35,671 spells from
individuals previously employed in the public sector and 17,577 from individuals older than 60
years. Next, we drop 533 spells from individuals working more than 60 hours or less than 12 hours
in their previous job and 151 spells from individuals who were eligible for a so-called ’education
and development fund’. Finally we exclude 8518 spells with a duration of zero days and 290 spells
from individuals with inconsistent or missing data (such as a negative unemployment duration).
These are often individuals for whom the application to benefits was later denied.
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We select a sample of individuals with a high propensity to participate in the
external programs. These are native males, aged 40 to 60 years, with a low un-
employment history (at most two unemployment spells in the past 3 years) and
belonging to the upper 60% of the income distribution in our data. This reduces the
sample to 116,866 observations. The advantage of restricting the sample is twofold.
First, the policy discontinuity affects this group strongest, which strengthens the
first stage of the analysis. Second, the estimates are more precise when using a
homogeneous sample.8
For each spell we observe the day of starting receiving UI benefits and, if the spell
is not right censored, the last day and the reason for the end of the benefit payments.
Right censoring occurs on January 1st, 2012, when our data was constructed, so for
each individual we can observe at least 16 months of benefits receipt. The dataset
contains a detailed description of all activation programs (both internally and ex-
ternally provided) in which benefits recipients participated. Furthermore individual
characteristics and pre-unemployment labor-market outcomes are included in the
dataset.
Figure 1 shows how the monthly number of individuals entering UI evolves over
time. Due to the economic crisis, there is a substantial increase in the inflow from
December 2008 onward. The inflow increased from about 2000 to 5000 per month
and remained high until the end of 2009. From 2010 onward the inflow decreased
somewhat. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample, as well as for
three subgroups defined by their month of inflow into unemployment. Column (1)
shows that for the full sample the median duration of unemployment is 245 days
(around eight months). Almost 60% of those exiting UI find work, while 15% reach
the end of their benefits entitlement period. Almost 7% leave unemployment due
to sickness or disability, the rest leave for other reasons or the reason for exit is
unknown. Exits due to reaching the end of the entitlement period and exits due
8For example, using a homogeneous sample improves the performance of the matching estima-
tors applied in Subsection 6.1 (Imbens (2014)).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Inflow cohort UI:
Full April April April
sample 2008 2009 2010
Unemployment duration (median, days) 245 175 280 275
Reason for exit (%):
Work 70.1 64.5 65.3 74.8
End of entitlement period 15.4 21.5 19.1 8.3
Sickness/Disability 6.7 6.2 7.3 7.6
Other 7.8 7.8 8.3 9.3
Participation external program (%):
Any program 18.7 24.0 32.3 0.7
Job-search assistance 11.0 17.1 21.3 0.3
Training 6.0 7.3 9.7 0.2
Subsidized employment 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.0
Other 4.9 4.4 7.7 0.2
Participation internal program (%):
Any program 36.8 13.5a 40.8 39.2
Job-search assistance 11.6 1.7a 12.1 13.6
Subsidized employment 3.2 1.1a 3.9 3.8
Tests 9.7 1.9a 10.3 10.9
Workshop entrepreneurship 4.4 2.3a 6.3 3.4
Other 19.7 9.1a 23.4 19.6
Gender (% males) b 100 100 100 100
Immigrant (%)b 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Previous hourly wage (%):
Lowb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Middle 57.4 53.8 58.3 53.1
High 42.6 46.2 41.7 46.9
Age 48.7 49.0 48.6 48.9
Unemployment size (hours)c 37.2 37.1 37.4 37.3
UI history last 3 year (%) 29.2 33.8 28.8 23.3
Education (%):
Low 22.8 20.0 21.6 20.5
Middle 46.5 43.0 45.7 47.1
High 30.7 37.1 32.7 32.4
Observations 116,866 1774 4441 4505
Job-search assistance contains ’IRO’ (Individual reintegration agreement), ’Job hunting’
and ’Application letter’. Training contains ’Short Training’ and ’Schooling’. Subsidized
employment contains ’Learn-work positions’. a Biased downwards, because participation
in internal programs was rarely recorded before 2009. b Used to select the sample. c
Unemployment size is the number of hours per week for which an individual is unemployed,
based on the number of weekly working hours in the lost job.
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Figure 1: Number of UI entrants per month
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Figure 2: Number of UI benefits recipients entering an external program per month
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to sickness or disability are unlikely to be affected by program participation (and
are in any case not outcomes of interest). Therefore, we focus on exits to work and
exits due to unknown reasons (these may often include situations in which workers
generate some income from other sources than employment).
In the full sample about 19% of the benefits recipients participate in one of the
externally provided programs. Two-thirds of these programs focus on job-search
assistance, a third involve some sort of training, while only a very small fraction
are subsidized employment. About 37% of all individuals participate in an internal
program, of which the majority is either some test (such as a competencies test) or
job-search assistance.
The dataset contains a large set of individual characteristics, including gender,
age, immigrant status, education level, previous hourly wage, unemployment size,
occupation in previous job, unemployment history, region and industry. In the
lower panel of Table 1 sample means are presented for some characteristics. The
average individual is almost full-time unemployed (37.2 hours) and 29% have already
experienced a period of unemployment in the three years before entering UI.
In columns (2), (3) and (4) the same statistics are presented for three subgroups
of individuals entering unemployment in April 2008, April 2009 and April 2010,
respectively. The impact of the policy discontinuity in March 2010 becomes clear
from the share of the April 2010 group that participate in an external program. It
drops to almost zero. To illustrate the impact of the discontinuity in March 2010, we
show the number of external programs started per month in Figure 2. The dashed
line indicates the moment of the policy change in March 2010. The number of
program entrants drops to almost zero in April 2010. Separate graphs for each type
of program are included in the appendix (Figure 17) and show that the discontinuity
occurs for all types of program.
The calendar date of entry in UI determines how the policy discontinuity affects
individuals. Figure 3 shows for the different inflow cohorts the weekly probability
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Figure 3: Hazard rate into the external programs by month of inflow
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of starting an external program.9 Each cohort reaches the policy discontinuity at a
different moment in their UI spell. This is illustrated by the fact that each subse-
quent cohort experiences the drop in the program entry hazard one month earlier
in their unemployment duration. The cohort of March 2010 has a probability of en-
tering an external program close to zero. Figure 3 also shows that participation in
some program is, in general, not restricted to a certain duration, though the hazard
is increasing during the unemployment spell. Before the policy discontinuity the
hazards of the different cohorts are very similar, indicating that there have not been
other major policy changes.
A concern might be that caseworkers have responded to the inability to assign
unemployed workers to external programs. However, resources for the internal pro-
grams remained unaffected around March 2010, limiting the scope for scaling up
9The graph shows the smoothed estimated hazard rate into the first external program of each
individual.
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Figure 4: Distribution of starting dates of the internally provided programs
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internal programs. The number of started internal programs per month is shown
in Figure 4. Internal programs are only recorded from 2009 onward. The policy
discontinuity of March 2010 is indicated by the dashed line. There is no indication
of a response around the date of the policy discontinuity. Separate graphs by type of
program are provided in the appendix (Figure 19). The hazard rates into an inter-
nal program for different cohorts are shown in Figure 5. The hazard rates are very
similar, supporting the assumption that internal program provision was unaffected
by the policy change.10
A further concern might be that even though the number of internal programs
was not changed, caseworkers may have reacted to the unavailability of external
programs by shifting their internal programs to these individuals that might oth-
erwise have participated in external programs. This would imply that the policy
10In theory, job seekers could decide to pay for an external program themselves once it is no longer
offered through the UI administration. However, the costs of these programs are considerable,
especially for unemployed, such that this never happens in the Netherlands.
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Figure 5: Hazard rate into the internal programs by month of inflow
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does not change external program participation to no participation, but, for some
individuals, changes it to internal program participation.
To investigate whether such a shift of internal program targeting indeed occurred,
we present sample means of characteristics of individuals enrolling in an internal
program per month in Figure 6. Mean age and weekly hours of unemployment are
shown in panel (a) of Figure 6, unemployment and disability history and education
level are shown in panel (b), the previous hourly wage is shown in panel (c) and the
share of nine industry categories is shown in panel (d). None of the graphs indicate
any kind of discontinuity around March 2010, which suggests that caseworkers did
not shift internal programs to individuals who would otherwise enroll in an external
program. The effect of enrollment in an external program should thus be interpreted
as the effect conditional on the allocation of internal programs.
16
Figure 6: Composition of the internal program participants
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5 Treatment effects
In this section we define the treatment effects that we aim to estimate. Recall
that only a small share of all unemployed workers enter an external program dur-
ing their unemployment spell. Due to the selectivity in the participation decision,
the composition of program participants differs from non-participants. We focus
on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). This treatment effect is
nonstandard because enrollment in the program is dynamic.
Our key outcome of interest is duration until employment, which is a random
variable denoted by T > 0. Define Yt = 1(T > t), a variable equal to one if the
individual is still unemployed in period t, and zero otherwise. And define S to
be a random variable denoting the duration at which program participation starts
(with realized value s). Potential unemployment durations depend on program
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participation. The dynamic nature of duration data implies that even for a single
program many different treatment effects arise. The program can start at different
durations, while the effect can be measured at different points in time (see for an
extensive discussion of dynamic treatment effects Abbring and Heckman (2007)).
We define potential outcomes when treated as:
Y ∗1,t(s) =
{
1 if T ∗(s) > t
0 if T ∗(s) < t
The potential outcome under no treatment is defined as Y ∗0,t = lims→∞ Y
∗
1,t. We adopt
the so-called no-anticipation assumption (Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)). This
assumption imposes that program participation at duration s only affects poten-
tial outcomes at durations t > s. This allows us to write the potential untreated
outcomes as
Y ∗0,t = Y
∗
1,t(s) ∀s > t
The no-anticipation assumption is strict since it rules out that individuals can
anticipate program participation prior to s by changing their job-search behavior
accordingly. This is unlikely for the programs we discuss in this paper. Programs
are assigned by caseworkers on an individual basis. There are no strict criteria for
participation and each period only a small fraction of the unemployed workers can
enroll, so it is impossible for job seekers to know in advance when they will enter
the program.
Individuals leave unemployment after different durations, such that the compo-
sition of the survivors changes over time. This dynamic selection requires defining
the subgroup for which the treatment effect is evaluated (see Van den Berg et al.
(2014)). We are interested in individuals that received job-search assistance after
s periods of unemployment. This implies that we should condition on surviving in
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unemployment for s periods, so we consider the sub-population with T > s. We are
interested in job finding for this group before t > s periods. This effect is defined by
Van den Berg et al. (2014) as the average treatment effect on the treated survivors
(ATTS(s, t)), with equals
ATTS(s, t) = E
[
Y ∗1,t(s)− Y ∗0,t
∣∣∣T > s, S = s] (1)
This is the treatment effect that we focus on in the analysis.
5.1 Choice of samples
We compare estimates for ATTS(s, t) using different methods. The different meth-
ods allow or require samples that are not necessarily the same. Exploiting the policy
discontinuity requires using a specific sample of individuals entering unemployment
around the time of the discontinuity. Matching and timing-of-events can use a much
larger sample including individuals entering unemployment earlier or later. We are
interested in comparing how the conclusion regarding effectiveness of the programs
depends on the method. Therefore, we argue that each method should be applied
’optimally’, that is, as it would have been applied in a stand-alone evaluation. As a
result, we use the larger available sample when the method allows, and the smaller
specific sample otherwise.
Any resulting difference in results can be due to different samples. We argue
Table 2: Methods and samples
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample: Discontinuity sample: Pre-disc. samplea
Inflow between Inflow between Inflow between
April ’08 and Oct. ’09 and April ’08 and
Sept. ’10 Jan. ’10 Jan. ’10
Matching yes yes yes
Timing-of-events yes yes yes
Quasi-experiment no yes no
a In addition to restricting the inflow period, this sample also censors obser-
vations at the discontinuity.
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that the sample selection is an essential part of the method. However, to investigate
to what extent the sample choice drives the results, we perform each analysis also
with a smaller sample that is the same across all methods (column (2) in Table 2).
A more extensive discussion on the selection of the smaller sample is presented in
Section 7, where we discuss the quasi-experimental approach exploiting the policy
discontinuity. In addition, we also apply the matching and timing of events ap-
proaches to a third sample that excludes the discontinuity period (column (3) in
Table 2). This sample contains only individuals entering unemployment before the
discontinuity and censor all observations at the time of the discontinuity. The ratio-
nale for applying such a sample is that the discontinuity creates exogenous variation
in program participation, and we study how non-experimental methods perform
without including such variation.
Our comparison considers the approaches presented in Table 2. The full sample
and the pre-discontinuity sample are used for the non-experimental methods only,
while the discontinuity sample is used for all three methods.
6 Non-experimental analysis
6.1 Matching estimator
We start the empirical analysis by applying a matching estimator as is commonly
used in the literature. This does not exploit the policy discontinuity, but instead
compares individuals with similar characteristics differing only in treatment status.
We apply a dynamic version of the matching estimator to account for the dynamic
setting and selection.
Matching methods construct counterfactual outcomes in the absence of random-
ized assignment (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), Abadie and Imbens (2011)) and
date back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The approach relies on two main as-
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sumptions. First, selection into treatment is on observables only:
Y ∗0,t(s), Y
∗
1,t(s) ⊥ S|X (2)
This unconfoundedness assumption implies that after conditioning on a set of ob-
served characteristics, assignment to treatment is independent of the potential out-
comes.11 Our administrative data include a rich set of covariates, which is crucial
for matching estimators. Employment histories are argued to be particularly impor-
tant, because they are strong predictors of future labor-market outcomes as well as
program participation (see, for example, Card and Sullivan (1988), Heckman et al.
(1999), Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Lechner et al. (2011) and Lechner and Wunsch
(2013)). In addition to employment history (previous hourly wage, unemployment
history, industry), we observe individual characteristics (age, gender, education level,
marital status, region) and variables describing the current unemployment spell (un-
employment size in hours, sickness or disability, maximum benefits entitlement).
This set of covariates is as least as extensive as usually available when evaluating
active labor-market programs.
Second, the matching estimator requires a common support in the distribution of
the covariates between program participants and non-participants. For our dynamic
setting we assume
fS(s;x) > 0 ∀x, s
where fS(s;x) is the density function of enrolling in the program after s periods of
unemployment conditional on the set of covariates x. At any duration, all individuals
have a positive probability of starting treatment regardless of their characteristics.
This ensures that if the sample size is sufficiently large, counterfactuals can always
be found. This assumption is likely to hold, since there are no (combinations of)
individual characteristics that perfectly predict program participation in our data.12
11Vikstro¨m (2016) for a discussion considering also a more general setting of the dynamic treat-
ment evaluation based on selection on observables.
12Figure 23 in the appendix shows the predicted probabilities of ever enrolling in the program
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Our baseline estimates are based on the full sample, and as robustness checks
we use two restricted samples (see subsection 5.1). We focus on starting the job-
search assistance program after three to five months. Since we are interested in
the average treatment effect for the treated survivors, we condition on surviving
in unemployment for at least three month. Furthermore, we censor unemployment
duration for individuals who enter the program after five months unemployment.
This approach is similar to Lalive et al. (2008) (see also for a discussion Sianesi
(2004)).
We use a logit model to predict program participation rates for all individuals
surviving for at least three months in unemployment. Next, we estimate for both
the treated and the control group the Kaplan-Meier estimates (taking censoring and
future program participation into account) for survival in unemployment, where we
weigh individuals in the control group to make the composition comparable to the
treatment group.13 The difference in the survival functions provides an estimate of
the average treatment effect on the treated survivors.14 This is shown in panel (a)
of Figure 7 together with the 95%-confidence interval which is obtained using boot-
strapping. Program participation significantly reduces the job finding probability,
although the negative effect becomes smaller over time. This is consistent with a
lock-in effect. The estimates state that those who participate in the job-search assis-
tance program are about 20%-point less likely to have found work within five months
after becoming unemployed. This effect reduces to about 7%-points 18 months after
becoming unemployed. Due to the large sample size the confidence interval is very
tight. Panel (b) and (c) of Figure 7 show that the estimated effects are not sensitive
(based on a logit model). This shows a large overlap which is usually considered as support for
the common support assumption (Busso et al. (2009)). The latter is due to the dynamic selection
in our setting, not true (i.e. individuals with particular characteristics may not receive treatment
because they leave unemployment quickly). However, when conditioning on survivors, we observed
a similar overlapping support.
13Individuals with characteristics xi in the control group get weight pˆ(xi)/(1 − pˆ(xi)), where
pˆ(xi) is the predicted treatment participation probability.
14Our approach is similar to the inverse probability weighting estimator described by Vikstro¨m
(2016), which also takes future program participation (for the control group) en right-censoring of
unemployment durations into account.
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Figure 7: Average treatment effect on the treated survivors (with 95% confidence
intervals): Matching estimator using Kaplan-Meier survival functions
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(a) Inflow between April 2008 - September 2010
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(b) Inflow between October 2009 - January 2010
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(c) Inflow between April 2008 - January 2010 (and
censored by March 2010)
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to the choice of the observation period. In both cases confidence intervals are wider
because reduced samples are used for the estimation.
6.2 Timing of events model
Matching requires little functional-form assumptions, but relies on a potentially
strong unconfoundedness assumption. The timing-of-events model (Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003)) allows for selection on unobservables, but makes stronger
functional-form assumptions. This model has been applied often in the recent lit-
erature on dynamic treatment evaluation (see for example Abbring et al. (2005),
Van den Berg et al. (2004), Lalive et al. (2005) and Van der Klaauw and Van Ours
(2013)).
The timing-of-events model jointly specifies job finding and entry into the pro-
gram using continuous-time duration models. To control for unobserved character-
istics the unobserved heterogeneity terms in both hazard rates are allowed to be
correlated. Identification relies on the mixed proportional structure of both hazard
rates. As discussed in subsection 7.1, the timing-of-events model requires the no-
anticipation assumption (as do the quasi-experimental approach and the matching
estimator). Note that this does not rule out that the treatment probability differs
between individuals and that individuals are aware of this. Some job seekers may
have a high probability of program assignment and know this. Only the exact timing
of the program start should be unanticipated.
We present a concise description of the model here, while a detailed version is
presented in the appendix. Consider an individual entering unemployment at cal-
endar date τ0. The job finding (hazard) rate depends on the number of days of
unemployment t, calendar time τ0 + t, observed characteristics x and unobserved
characteristics ve. When starting the job-search program after s periods of unem-
ployment, the hazard rate shifts by the treatment effect δt−s, which can depend
on the elapsed duration t − s since entering the program. The treatment effect is
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modeled as piecewise constant function of the elapsed duration since starting the
program (see Appendix A for the parameterization). The job finding rate is given
by:
θe(t|x, τ0, s, ve) = φe(t)ψe(τ0 + t) exp
[
xβe + δt−sI(t > s)
]
ve (3)
Estimation of equation (3) yields a biased estimate of the treatment effects if pro-
gram participation is (even conditional on the observed characteristics) non-random.
To account for this, program participation is modeled jointly, also using a mixed pro-
portional hazard rate:
θp(s|x, τ0, vp) = φp(s)ψp(τ0 + s) exp(xβp)vp (4)
With all notation similar to equation (3), but subscript e replaced by subscript
p. The unobserved term vp is allowed to be correlated with ve, with joint discrete
distribution g(ve, vp). We take g(ve, vp) to be a bivariate discrete distribution with
an unrestricted number of mass points. The duration dependence patterns and the
calendar time effects are parameterized with a piecewise constant function. Esti-
mation of the parameters is performed by maximizing the log-likelihood, in which
right-censoring is straightforwardly taken into account.
The model is estimated using the full sample, as well as using the smaller discon-
tinuity sample and the pre-discontinuity sample. Full estimation results, including
all estimated coefficients, are presented in the appendix in Table 4.15
The estimates of the program participation effects are presented in the first
column of Table 4. The effect of program participation is estimated to have a
large, significantly negative effect on the job finding rate in the first three months
(δ
0−3 months), with the hazard ratio equal to 0.723. In the next three months the
effect is still significantly negative, but smaller in magnitude (0.873). After six
15The coefficients of the job finding hazard (equation (3)) have the expected sign and most are
highly significant. Outflow from unemployment is higher for higher education levels, higher income
and lower age. Having a sickness or disability history decreases outflow, while being married or
cohabiting increases outflow. Furthermore, we find that the job finding rate decreases steadily over
unemployment duration.
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Table 3: Treatment effect estimates Timing-of-Events model
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Discontinuity Pre-discont.
sample sample
Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er.
Program effect on UI outflow:
δ
(1−3 months) 0.723 0.021 0.765 0.043 0.606 0.032
δ
(4−6 months) 0.873 0.022 0.796 0.047 0.738 0.042
δ
(>6 months) 1.080 0.016 1.046 0.036 0.853 0.056
Observations 116,625 23,502 83,773
Reported values are hazard ratios. The full sample contains all individuals entering
unemployment between April 2008 and September 2010. The discontinuity sample
contains all individuals entering unemployment between October 2009 and January
2010. The pre-discontinuity sample contains all individuals entering unemployment
between April 2008 and January 2010, and censors all observations at the time of
the discontinuity (March 2010).
months (δ≥6 months) program participation has a modest but significantly positive
effect on the probability of finding a job (1.080). When using the smaller “discon-
tinuity” sample of individuals entering unemployment in October 2009 - January
2010, we find very similar estimates for the program effects: a negative effect over
the first six months, and a positive effect afterwards (see column (2) in Table 3).
Standard errors are larger due to the smaller sample size. The third sample on
which we estimate the model is the pre-discontinuity sample. Note that by exclud-
ing observations from the discontinuity period, we exclude all exogenous variation
in program participation. Results are presented in column (3), and we find some-
what more negative effects on outflow. Furthermore, the negative impact on outflow
remains even after six months.
In the first two estimations we find no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity.
That is, the probability of all mass points except one converge to zero. This finding
suggests that, when conditioning on all observables in our dataset, little additional
factors remain that determine both outflow from unemployment and program as-
signment. However, when using the third sample, we do find some unobserved
26
heterogeneity. The fact that the third sample leads to more negative estimates,
suggests that there is negative selection. Those that participate in programs have,
on average, worse labor market prospects. The first two samples, that include vari-
ation in participation due to the discontinuity, suffer from this problem to a lesser
extent. However, the relatively small difference in estimates suggests that the selec-
tion problem is modest.
The estimates for the parameters δ provide a multiplicative effect on the job
finding rates, but can not be directly interpreted as measure for the treatment
effects ATTS(s, t). Therefore, we follow Kastoryano and Van der Klaauw (2011),
who define for unemployed worker i with observed characteristics xi
E[Y ∗1,t(s)−Y ∗0,t|T > s;xi, ve] =
exp(− ∫ t
0
θe(z|xi, t, ve)dz)− exp(−
∫ t
0
θe(z|xi, s, ve)dz)
exp(− ∫ s
0
θe(z|xi, s, ve)dz)
To translate this in the average treatment effect on the treated survivors, we should
condition on the rate of receiving treatment after s periods. Therefore, we use the
hazard rate model for entering the program, which gives
ATTS(s, t) =
∫
v
∑
i f(s|xi, vp)E[Y ∗1,t(s)− Y ∗0,t|T > s;xi, ve]dG(ve, vp)∫
v
∑
i f(s|xi, vp)dG(ve, vp)
(5)
where f(s|xi, ve, vp) = θp(s|xi, vp) exp(−
∫ s
0
θe(z|xi, ve, s) + θp(z|xi, vp)dz) is the rate
at which individual i enter the job search assistance program after s periods. We
use the delta method to compute standard errors around the treatment effects.
In panel (a) of Figure 8 we present simulated survivor functions for an untreated
job seeker and for a job seeker starting a program after two months.16 Participating
in a program after two months of unemployment lowers the probability of being
employed subsequently, in accordance with the negative effect estimate. In panel
(b) we present the treatment effect (ATTS, equation (5)) with a 95% confidence
16These are for nonparticipants
∫
v
[
N−1
∑
i exp(−
∫ t
0
θe(z|xi, s, ve)dz
]
dG(ve, vp)) and of program
participants
∫
v
[
N−1
∑
i exp(−
∫ t
0
θe(z|xi, t, ve)dz)
]
dG(ve, vp).
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Figure 8: Timing-of-events model: treatment effect with full sample
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interval computed using the delta method. The difference is significantly negative
directly after the program starts, and increases in magnitude up to almost 6%-
points after six months. At longer durations the difference decreases in magnitude
and converges to zero.
7 Quasi-experimental analysis
We now turn to the policy discontinuity to investigate how exploiting the exogenous
variation compares to the estimates from the previous section. We start by charac-
terizing how the discontinuity allows identification of the effect of the program on
outflow to work.
7.1 Identification
Estimating the ATTS (equation (1)) without making parametric assumptions is gen-
erally not possible from observational data (Abbring and Van den Berg (2005)). A
policy discontinuity provides exogenous variation which allows to estimate the ATTS
(Van den Berg et al. (2014). Consider two cohorts of entrants in unemployment.
The first enters unemployment at some point in time, with the time until the policy
change equal to t1. The second cohort enters unemployment later, but still before
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Figure 9: Treatment effect identification
the policy change. For this cohort the time until the policy change equals t2 < t1.
This is illustrated in Figure 9. The two cohorts face the same policy of potential
program assignment for t2 time periods, implying that dynamic selection is the same
up to this point. After t2, the first cohort faces another period of potential program
assignment, with length t1 − t2, while the second cohort is excluded from program
participation. As a result, we can compare the outflow to employment in the two
cohorts, for those individuals that survived up to t2 and did not enroll in a program
prior to t2.
To assign differences in job finding between these groups to program partic-
ipation, two assumptions should hold. First, the policy discontinuity should be
unanticipated by unemployed workers and caseworkers. Anticipation of the policy
discontinuity is problematic, as behavior of job seekers or caseworkers may be af-
fected in the period just before March 2010. The policy change we are investigating
however has the advantage that it was unexpected. The UI administration only
realized late that there was no longer budget for these programs and expected that
the Ministry of Social Affairs would extend the budget. Enrollment in the external
programs stopped immediately after an extension of the budget was rejected. Since
not even the UI administration was expecting the change, we can safely assume
that job seekers and caseworkers did not anticipate it either. The second assump-
tion is that there should be no differences between the two cohorts in factors that
29
affect job finding, other than the difference in program assignment. We discuss this
assumption below.
7.1.1 Business cycle, seasonalities and cohort composition
Even if two cohorts are compared that enter unemployment relatively shortly after
each other, changes in the labor market conditions may lead to differences in out-
comes. We discuss how this may affect our estimates, and how we correct for this.
Figure 10 presents the unemployment rate and the inflow and outflow of unemploy-
ment. The two vertical full lines indicate the observation period that is used in the
analysis. The vertical dashed line indicates the policy discontinuity. In the period
before the policy discontinuity, 2009 and the beginning of 2010, unemployment was
rising. During 2010 it decreased slightly, while in 2011 it started increasing again.
In the short-run, seasonalities are the main source of fluctuations in unemployment.
Also inflow into and outflow from UI are relatively stable around the policy disconti-
nuity, except for short-run fluctuations. Such fluctuations in labor market conditions
may affect outcomes in two ways. First, they affect the composition of the inflow
into unemployment. For example, the financial crisis may cause that different types
of workers become unemployed. A changing composition affects aggregate outflow
probabilities. Second, labor market conditions affect outflow probabilities directly,
as it is often more difficult to find employment when unemployment is high.
To correct for differences in composition we exploit the set of covariates in the
data. In particular, we use weights to make each cohort in composition of observed
characteristics comparable to the March 2010 cohort. As characteristics we use
three previous hourly wage categories, an indicator for having been unemployed in
the past three years, an indicator for being married or cohabiting, age categories, an
indicator for being part-time unemployed (less than 34 hours per week)17 and three
education categories. Interacting these covariates we obtain 288 groups. Define the
share of group g in cohort c by αc,g. The weight assigned to an observation belonging
17Since this is based on the previous job, it captures part-time and full-time employment.
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Figure 10: Labor market indicators
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to group g in cohort c is given by:
wc,g =
αmar2010,g
αc,g
We define the survivor functions that will be estimated in the analysis, as the
weighted average of the survivor functions of each cohort-group:
F¯c(t) =
∑
g
wc,gF¯c,g(t) (6)
These weights are applied in all further analysis, however the results are robust
against using weights.
The direct effect of the business cycle and seasonal effects on employment proba-
bilities requires further discussion. To formalize these factors, consider the following
simple model. Assume that the hazard rate to employment (h) for cohort c depends
on the duration of unemployment (t), the effect of the business cycle (bc), the effect
of seasonalities (lc) and the effect of entry into a program at time s, which is γ(s).
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To correct for business cycle effects when identifying the effect of program partici-
pation, we need to make some assumptions about the hazard. We assume that the
business cycle, seasonalities and treatment have an additive effect on the baseline
hazard, where each of these impacts may vary by unemployment duration t. Note
that this is very flexible as we do not assume anything on how these factors vary
by duration. The duration dependence of the hazard is denoted by λ(t), which is
common for all cohorts. The hazard rate is given by
h(t, s, c) = λ(t) + bc(t) + lc(t) + γ(s, t) (7)
From the hazard rate we can construct the survival function.
F¯c(t) = exp
(− ∫ t
0
h(u)du
)
= exp
(− ∫ t
0
λ(u)du−
∫ t
0
bc(u)du−
∫ t
0
lc(u)du−
∫ t
s
γ(u)du
)
Taking the logarithm of the survival function we have:
log F¯c(t) = −
∫ t
0
λ(u)du−
∫ t
0
bc(u)du−
∫ t
0
lc(u)du−
∫ t
s
γ(u)du
≡ ∆(t) +Bc(t) + Lc(t) + Γ(s, t)
This implies that the business cycle, seasonalities and program participation have
additive impacts on the log of the survival function. Seasonalities are by definition
those factors that are common across different years, such that Lc(t) = Lc−12(t),
for all c. The difference in log survivor functions of two cohorts identifies the treat-
ment effect plus the difference in seasonal and business cycle effects. For example,
comparing the January 2010 cohort with the October 2009 cohort we get:
µ1(t) = log F¯jan10(t)− log F¯oct09(t)
= Γ(s, t) +
[
Ljan10(t)− Loct09(t)
]
+
[
Bjan10(t)−Boct09(t)
]
(8)
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If we condition both survivor functions on survival up to t2 (in this case t2 =
two months), the January 2010 cohort never enters a program, while a share of
the October 2009 cohort enters a program. The term Γ(s, t) measures the effect
of program participation of a share of a cohort, and can thus be interpreted as an
intention-to-treat effect. Below we discuss how to this relates to the ATTS (equation
(1)). The size of the bias due to the remaining terms, (Ljan10(t) − Loct09(t)) and
(Bjan10(t) − Boct09(t)), depends on the length of the time interval between the two
cohorts, and the volatility of the labor market.
We can possibly improve on this estimator by applying an approach related to a
difference-in-differences estimator. By subtracting the same cohort difference from
a year earlier, we eliminate the seasonal effects, at the cost of adding extra business
cycle effects:
µ2(t) =
[
log F¯jan10(t)− log F¯oct09(t)
]− [ log F¯jan09(t)− log F¯oct08(t)]
= Γ(t) +
[
Bjan10(t)−Boct09(t)
]
+
[
Bjan09(t)−Boct08(t)
]
(9)
Whether this is preferable over µ1(t) depends on the relative sizes of the business
cycle and seasonal effects. Figure 10 suggests that, if the interval is sufficiently small,
seasonal effects are much larger than business cycle effects. Given a small interval
such as three months, business cycle effects may be small enough to ignore, such that
µ2 is a satisfactory estimator of Γ(t). Note that this estimator is an extension of the
approach suggested by Van den Berg et al. (2014), who exploit a policy discontinuity
to estimate effects on a duration variable. We add to this approach by taking double
differences.
The estimators µ1(t) and µ2(t) estimate intention-to-treat effects, since not all
unemployed workers in the earlier cohort enter a program. The average treatment
effect on the treated survivors follows from dividing the intention to treat effect by
the difference in the share of each cohorts that enrolls in the program. Define F¯ treat
as the survivor function for treatment, where an exit is defined to be the start of
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the first program. The ATTS estimator is given by:
ATTS(t2, t) =
µ1(t)
log F¯ Treatjan10 (t)− log F¯ Treatoct09 (t)
(10)
And similar for µ2(t).
7.2 Results: intention-to-treat effect
We start by defining which cohorts to compare. A cohort contains all individuals
entering unemployment within one particular month. The time interval between
cohorts should be small to minimize business cycle and seasonal effects, but the
trade-off is that more time between cohorts increases the difference in exposure to
potential program participation. We use cohorts three months apart. Second, to
exploit the policy discontinuity, the cohorts should not enter unemployment too
long before March 2010. Therefore, we use the cohorts of October 2009 until Jan-
uary 2010, facing between five and two months of potential program participation,
respectively. Each cohort will be compared to the cohort entering unemployment
three months earlier. The survivor function of each cohort is presented in Figure 11.
Around 50% of the UI benefits recipients find work within 12 months, while after
two years around 65% has found work.
We first take the difference between the log of the survivor function and the
log of the survivor function of the cohort entering unemployment three months
earlier (µ1(t)).18 This compares the outflow of a cohort from in which no one enrolls
in the program to outflow of a cohort in which a share enrolls in the program.
As discussed in subsection 7.1, we condition on survival and no-treatment up to
the duration at which the later cohort reaches the policy discontinuity. So when
comparing January 2010 with October 2009, only individuals are included with an
unemployment duration of at least three months and who do not start an external
18All estimates presented in this section are estimated using weights as discussed in subsection
7.1.1.
34
Figure 11: Survivor functions by month of inflow
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Figure 12: Intention-to-treat effect estimates, conditional on T > t2, S > t2
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program in the first two months. The differences up to a duration of 18 months
after inflow in unemployment are presented in panel (a) of Figure 12.19 We find a
negative effect on job finding during the first few months after program participation
of around 4%-points in three of the four estimates. After about 10-12 months the
negative effect disappears and all estimates are close to zero.
These estimates are based on simple differences between cohorts, thus not taking
19For the ease of interpretation, in the graph we present a transformation of the estimates µ1.
We display [exp(µ1) − 1]F¯ , which is the effect on the actual survival function. So the graph can
be interpreted as the effect on the probability of finding employment. The same transformation is
made in subsequent graphs.
35
fluctuations in labor market conditions into account. By subtracting the same dif-
ferences from a year earlier, we correct for cohort differences that are constant across
years (such as seasonalities). Estimates from such a “difference-in-differences” ap-
proach (µ2(t)) are presented in panel (b) of Figure 12.20 Again we find a negative
effect on job finding in the first months. At longer durations, the estimates di-
verge somewhat. In the appendix we present for each line a 95% confidence interval
(standard errors are computed using bootstrapping) in Figure 20. The early negative
effect is always significantly different from zero, while none of the estimates at longer
durations are significantly different from zero. Note that each comparison measures
the effect of additional treatment at a slightly different duration. For example, the
January 2010-October 2009 comparison measures the effect of additional treatment
in the 3th-5th month of unemployment, while the December 2009-September 2009
comparison measures the effect of additional treatment in the 4th-6th month of
unemployment.
The results show a pattern that is quite consistent across different cohort com-
parisons and across the two estimators. Job finding is significantly reduced in the
early months, while the difference disappears after 6-12 months. This finding is in
line with the lock-in effect often found in the literature (see for example Lechner and
Wunsch (2009)). The lock-in effect implies that when a program starts, participants
shift attention from job search to the program which reduces their job finding rate.
This negative effect disappears after some months, but we do not find any (positive)
effects at longer durations.
7.3 Results: average treatment effect
The above findings are intention-to-treat effects. To estimate the average effect of
treatment on individual employment probabilities they need to be scaled by the
differences in treatment intensity. We divide each estimate by the difference in
20When estimating µ2(t) we only present estimates up to the duration at which the cohorts from
a year earlier reach the policy discontinuity, which is between 15 and 18 months. Estimates at
longer durations are biased as the earlier cohorts are affected by the policy discontinuity as well.
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Figure 13: Differences in program participation, conditional on T > t2 and S > t2
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(a) Simple difference
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(b) Double difference
program participation of the cohorts that are being compared (as defined in equation
(10)). The difference in program participation occurs during a three months period
in which the later cohort reached the policy discontinuity but the earlier cohort did
not. We estimate the difference in program participation by the difference between
the survivor functions for program participation (as defined in subsection 7.1.1). For
example, when comparing the January 2010 cohort with the October 2009 cohort,
the difference in program participation is given by
F¯ treatJan10(t|T, S > 2 months)− F¯ treatOct09(t|T, S > 2 months) (11)
And similar for the other cohorts that are compared. These estimates are presented
in panel (a) of Figure 13. We find a clear increase as soon as the first cohort reaches
March 2010. The difference increases for approximately three months, after which
the comparison cohort reaches March 2010. From that point onward, both cohorts
receive no treatment, and the difference remains stable. The difference is between
15 and 20%-points. The difference in program participation can also be computed
using the same “difference-in-differences” approach as in µ2(t). Such estimates are
presented in panel (b) of Figure 13. Due to differencing with cohorts from a year
earlier, the differences are less smooth, though the main pattern remains. Confidence
intervals are presented in Figure 21 in the Appendix. All differences are highly
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Figure 14: Average treatment effect, conditioned on T > t2, S > t2
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(a) based on µ1(t)
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(b) based on µ2(t)
significant.
The results of dividing the estimates from panel (a) in Figure 12 by the treatment
difference are presented in panel (a) of Figure 14. The pattern does not differ much
from that of the intention-to-treat effects. Program participation reduces the job
finding probability during the first two-three months by about 40%-point, while after
ten months employment probabilities are similar again and there is no significant
effect. The double differencing estimates (µ2(t)) are presented in panel (b) of Figure
14. The pattern is quite similar. There is a negative effect on the job finding
probability of 40%-point directly after program participation starts, which decreases
in magnitude over time towards a zero effect after about eight months (confidence
interval are presented in Figure 22 in the Appendix).
Since the policy discontinuity reduced program participation to zero, these es-
timates can be interpreted as average treatment effects on the treated, rather than
local average treatment effects. Alternatively, if the policy discontinuity only had
reduced program participation (but not to zero), our approach would have estimated
the treatment effect on those individuals that would have participated before the
policy discontinuity but not afterwards. In the terminology of instrumental vari-
ables, these are the “compliers”. The fact that the policy discontinuity reduced
program participation to zero, implies that there are no “always-takers”, and the
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Figure 15: Common trend tests, µ2(t), three months differences
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local average treatment effect equals the average treatment effect.
7.4 Common trend assumption
The assumption that the business cycle terms in (9) are negligible has some simi-
larities with the common trend assumption in a difference-in-differences estimator.
It requires that in the absence of the policy discontinuity, the difference in employ-
ment rate between the January and November cohort would have been the same in
2009/2010 as a year earlier in 2008/2009. This is by definition not testable. How-
ever, we can get an indication of the plausibility of the assumption, by investigating
the survivor functions over the first months of each cohort, so before exposure to the
policy discontinuity. All estimators condition on survival up to t2, but we can use
information on job finding before t2 to get some indication about the validity of our
common trend assumption. To have a sufficient number of pre-discontinuity months
in the latest cohort, we focus on the comparisons of December 2009, November 2009
and October 2009. Basically, we estimate µ2(t) for t ≤ t2, without conditioning on
survival up to a certain duration.
Estimates are presented in Figure 15 for December 2009 - September 2009,
November 2009 - August 2009 and October 2009 - July 2009, including 95% con-
fidence intervals, computed using bootstrapping. We find that all estimates are
significantly negative, though small in magnitude. This implies that the treatment
effect estimates are biased downwards somewhat, and thus provide lower bounds of
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the effect.
8 Discussion
We have estimated the impact of the (external) activation programs on the exit rate
to work using three approaches, (i) a dynamic matching estimator, (ii) the timing-
of-events model, and (iii) exploiting a policy discontinuity as natural experiment.
In this section we compare the results and discuss similarities and differences.
Figure 16 presents the three estimates in one graph.21 The matching estimate
corresponds to panel (a) in Figure 7. The timing-of-events estimate corresponds to
the difference in simulated survivor functions presented in panel (b) of Figure 8. The
quasi-experimental estimate is the one based on comparing the cohorts of January
2010 and October 2009 (panel (b) of Figure 14).22 All three estimates represent the
effect of participating in a program after three to six months of unemployment on
the probability of finding work.
Figure 16: Comparing different estimates
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21Note that for the matching estimates and the timing-of-events estimates we performed the
analysis both using the full sample, and using the smaller “discontinuity” sample and the pre-
discontinuity sample. Since the results are similar we focus on the estimates using the full sample.
22For simplicity we focus on this particular estimate, but the other estimates follow a similar
pattern.
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Each method measures the same treatment parameter and the estimates should
thus be similar if all assumptions of the estimators are valid. Indeed, We find that
the three methods lead to a similar conclusion. Immediately after the program
is started, the job finding rate is reduced. After some months the effect becomes
smaller, implying that the outflow is somewhat higher for program participants. In
the medium-long run the difference in the probability of having found work is close
to zero. All three methods thus yield similar policy conclusions. The program has
a negative effect in the short run and at best a zero effect in the medium long-run.
Vikstro¨m (2016) finds a similar pattern in his dynamic evaluation of a Swedish work
practice program. Note that we cannot estimate impacts at longer durations, such
that we are not able to exclude the possibility of positive long-run effects. However,
for job search assistance programs this is typically not expected (e.g. Card et al.
(2010)).
Even though the implications are the same, the magnitude of the estimated
impact different. The quasi-experimental estimate is largest in size, largely because
the intention-to-treat effect is inflated by a small treatment share in the population.
This estimate is also less precise, and the matching and timing-of-events estimates
fall within its confidence interval at most durations (see panel (a) of Figure 22, in the
Appendix).23 Furthermore, the results in subsection 7.4 suggest that if the common
trend assumption is violated, it most likely leads to a (small) downward bias in the
quasi-experimental estimate.
9 Conclusion
Several methods are available when evaluating activation programs for unemployed
job seekers. In this paper we compare estimates from three different methods. First,
23Since the estimators are based on different models and are not independent, the confidence
intervals cannot convincingly show whether the differences between methods are significant. To
test for significant differences, we bootstrap the difference between the quasi-experimental and
matching estimator. The difference between the estimators, including a 95% confidence interval,
is presented in Figure 24. We find that the two methods are only different at very short durations
and after 11 months since the program start.
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matching estimators rely on a large set of individual covariates to justify the con-
ditional independence assumption. Second, the timing-of-events model allows for
unobserved heterogeneity at the expense of a making functional form assumptions
on the hazard rate specifications. Third, we exploit exogenous variation in program
participation, caused by budgetary problems of the UI administration. The resulting
discontinuity in program participation acts as a natural experiment.
The three resulting estimates are not identical, but reveal similar conclusions
on the effectiveness of the program. All three methods suggest a significantly neg-
ative effect of program participation on outflow to employment over the first few
months. This is in line with the well-documented lock-in effect. The magnitude
of the negative effect differs somewhat. While the quasi-experimental estimates
suggest reductions in outflow probabilities of up to 40%-points, the matching and
timing-of-events estimates are somewhat smaller (5-15%-points).
At longer durations, the quasi-experimental estimates suggest an (imprecise) zero
effect on employment. Both the matching and timing-of-events estimates converge
towards zero at longer durations, but remain significantly negative. The similarity of
the results shows that, conditional on the wide set of observed characteristics, there
is no strong selection in program participation. This lack of selection is confirmed by
the absence of estimated unobserved heterogeneity in the timing-of-events model.
In any case, such selection is not strong enough to cause large differences in the
findings. The broad conclusion drawn from each method is that the programs are
not effective in increasing outflow.
Our findings are based on a specific type of individuals (those that were most
likely to participate in the program), which we selected to increase homogeneity
of the sample as well as maximize the treated share before the policy discontinu-
ity. Both factors improve the performance of all our estimators. This group has
relatively favorable characteristics though (native males with above average wages
and below average unemployment histories), which may affect our empirical results.
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Our findings can, therefore, not be generalized to the full population. Since this pa-
per focuses on the comparison of methods rather than estimating the average effect
of the program on the full population, we opted for restricting our sample in this
manner.
In the meta-analysis performed by Kluve (2010), no relation is found between
the methodology and the likelihood of positive or negative effects. Our results are
in line with this finding, though our comparison is across methods applied to the
same data, setting and program, rather than across different studies. We conclude
that in the case of activation programs, a large set of observed characteristics may
be sufficient to correct for most selectivity in participation.
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A Timing-of-events model
The timing-of-events model contains two hazard rates, which have a mixed propor-
tional specification. The job finding rate is given by:
θe(t|x, τ0, s, ve) = φe(t)ψe(τ0 + t) exp
[
xβe + δt−sI(t > s)
]
ve (12)
and the entry rate into the program by:
θp(s|x, τ0, vp) = φp(s)ψp(τ0 + s) exp(xβp)vp (13)
We specify the duration dependence patterns φe(t) and φp(s) as piecewise con-
stant, so φj(t) = exp
(∑M
m=1 pijmIm(t)
)
for j = e, p), where Im(t) describes duration
intervals with thresholds after 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24 months. The calendar time indicators
ψe(τ0 + t) and ψp(τ0 + t) contain dummy variables for each quarter.
The unobserved heterogeneity (ve, vp) is modeled using a discrete mass-point
specification, so
pk = Pr(ve = vek, vp = vpk)
with unrestrictive mass points ve1, . . . veK and vp1, . . . , vpK under the restriction p1 +
· · ·+ pK = 1. We try different values of K. In practice, for higher values of K, the
locations of some mass points converge.
The loglikelihood function takes exogenous right censoring of durations into ac-
count. The loglikelihood function is specified as
logL = ∑i log [ K∑
k=1
pk · θe(ti|xi, τ0i, si, vek)cei · exp
(
−
∫ ti
0
θe(u|xi, τ0i, si, vek)du
)
·
θp(si|xi, τ0i, vpk)cpi · exp
(
−
∫ si
0
ha(u|xi, τ0i, vpk)du
)]
where ti is the observed unemployment duration, si the observed duration before
entering the program, cei denotes if the individuals finds work and cpi describes if
entry in the program is observed.
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B Additional empirical material
Figure 17: Starting dates of externally provided programs
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(a) IRO (Individual reintegration agree-
ment)
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(b) Short training
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(c) Jobhunting
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(d) Standard programs
0
20
40
60
80
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(e) Learn-work jobs
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
gr
am
 s
ta
rts
2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Starting month program
(f) Schooling
49
Figure 18: Timing of externally provided programs
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Figure 19: Starting dates of internally provided programs
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Figure 20: Experimental estimates (µ2(t)) with 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 21: Double difference in treatment share with 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 22: Average treatment effect with 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 23: Estimated propensity scores for treated and non-treated individuals
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Figure 24: Difference between experimental and matching estimator (with 95% con-
fidence interval)
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Table 4: Estimates Timing-of-Events model
Full sample Discontinuity sample Pre-disc. sample
UI exit rate Program rate UI exit rate Program rate UI exit rate Program rate
Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er. Coef. st.er.
Program effect:
Months 0-3 0.723 0.021 0.765 0.043 0.606 0.032
Months 4-6 0.873 0.022 0.796 0.047 0.738 0.042
Months 7- 1.080 0.016 1.046 0.036 0.853 0.056
Individual characteristics:
Unemployed hours 1.015 0.001 1.005 0.002 1.017 0.002 1.009 0.004 1.004 0.002 0.991 0.002
Middle educated 1.092 0.010 1.200 0.018 1.078 0.021 1.230 0.043 1.058 0.017 1.112 0.020
High educated 1.114 0.012 1.007 0.023 1.041 0.027 0.916 0.059 1.092 0.020 0.960 0.025
Income (cat. 4) 1.102 0.011 0.965 0.019 1.139 0.024 0.933 0.045 1.032 0.018 0.903 0.021
Income (cat. 5) 1.030 0.012 0.803 0.020 1.079 0.025 0.726 0.050 1.041 0.019 0.791 0.022
Age 45-50 0.924 0.010 1.093 0.019 0.902 0.021 1.048 0.048 0.906 0.016 1.110 0.022
Age 50-55 0.787 0.012 1.169 0.022 0.784 0.023 1.118 0.053 0.825 0.019 1.201 0.024
Age 55-60 0.474 0.015 0.846 0.025 0.492 0.027 0.802 0.062 0.549 0.023 0.901 0.028
UI eligibility 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000
Region 2 0.931 0.014 0.793 0.024 0.908 0.029 0.858 0.053 0.875 0.024 0.710 0.027
Region 3 0.987 0.014 0.702 0.024 0.954 0.029 0.657 0.056 0.866 0.024 0.631 0.027
Region 4 0.903 0.016 0.759 0.027 0.829 0.034 0.676 0.066 0.885 0.026 0.714 0.030
Region 5 0.953 0.015 0.612 0.025 0.909 0.030 0.527 0.063 0.925 0.024 0.544 0.029
Region 6 0.929 0.015 0.672 0.026 0.903 0.031 0.576 0.063 0.910 0.026 0.592 0.030
Region 7 1.026 0.030 0.280 0.082 1.051 0.064 0.516 0.155 1.243 0.046 0.303 0.086
UI history (cat. 2) 1.262 0.011 1.015 0.022 1.309 0.024 0.820 0.055 1.182 0.019 0.977 0.025
UI history (cat. 3) 1.081 0.013 0.997 0.024 1.173 0.028 0.820 0.063 0.956 0.022 0.944 0.027
UI history (cat. 4) 0.827 0.019 0.956 0.029 0.860 0.048 0.982 0.089 0.746 0.029 0.870 0.032
UI history (cat. 5) 0.804 0.031 0.896 0.045 0.818 0.088 1.075 0.138 0.727 0.043 0.748 0.050
Sickness or disability history (short) 0.631 0.034 1.084 0.050 0.567 0.081 1.447 0.118 0.574 0.062 1.062 0.056
Sickness or disability history (long) 0.403 0.033 0.918 0.041 0.355 0.085 1.028 0.116 0.337 0.060 0.847 0.047
Sickness or disability during UI 0.736 0.030 0.900 0.045 0.811 0.064 1.202 0.105 0.698 0.050 0.691 0.055
Cohabiting 1.212 0.015 0.973 0.026 1.205 0.033 0.993 0.065 1.173 0.024 0.893 0.029
Married 1.387 0.012 0.988 0.020 1.423 0.027 1.041 0.052 1.312 0.019 0.956 0.022
Single parent 1.053 0.035 0.946 0.060 1.003 0.087 0.848 0.177 0.981 0.055 0.862 0.067
Divorced 1.070 0.017 0.960 0.028 1.119 0.037 0.920 0.072 0.989 0.028 0.927 0.031
Unknown marital status 1.013 0.032 1.095 0.064 0.917 0.075 1.223 0.144 0.863 0.059 0.894 0.076
Duration dependence:
Months 1-3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Months 4-6 1.319 0.011 1.371 0.018 1.140 0.029 1.031 0.046 1.443 0.017 1.475 0.019
Months 7-9 1.053 0.013 1.788 0.020 0.867 0.045 0.285 0.318 1.298 0.024 2.108 0.023
Months 10-12 0.810 0.016 1.881 0.025 0.979 0.064 0.100 0.784 0.831 0.039 1.874 0.033
Months 13-18 0.659 0.017 1.427 0.032 0.966 0.091 0.766 0.051 1.629 0.047
Months 19-24 0.534 0.022 0.990 0.079 1.186 0.121 0.452 0.141
Months 25- 0.514 0.030 0.131 1.094 1.515 0.177
Calendar time effects
Quarter 1 1 1 1 1
Quarter 2 0.866 0.040 0.426 0.067 0.793 0.039 0.194 0.064
Quarter 3 0.506 0.040 0.561 0.058 0.439 0.040 0.301 0.049
Quarter 4 0.581 0.037 0.573 0.054 0.529 0.037 0.270 0.046
Quarter 5 0.509 0.036 0.633 0.053 0.456 0.036 0.341 0.043
Quarter 6 0.467 0.036 0.650 0.052 0.377 0.035 0.443 0.040
Quarter 7 0.324 0.037 0.925 0.051 1 1
Quarter 8 0.597 0.035 0.711 0.052 3.703 0.045 0.867 0.039
Quarter 9 0.635 0.035 0.030 0.083 4.713 0.054 0.065 0.130
Quarter 10 0.564 0.035 0.003 0.194 3.470 0.067 0.038 0.436
Quarter 11 0.477 0.037 0.008 0.134 2.011 0.086 0.091 0.818
Quarter 12 0.666 0.037 0.006 0.169 2.580 0.104 0.428 0.803
Quarter 13 0.643 0.039 0.002 0.254 1.858 0.113 0.081 0.823
Quarter 14 0.559 0.042 1.335 0.136
Quarter 15 0.412 0.047 0.838 0.154
Quarter 16 0.491 0.062 0.735 0.215
Unobserved heterogeneity
v1 0.015 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000
v2 0.003 0.002 0.997 0.368 0.007 0.009
p1 0.002 1.000 0.053
p2 0.998 0.000 0.947
Observations 116,652 23,502 83,773
All reported values are hazard rates.
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